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I. INTRODUCTION
Society views the sex offender as an especially heinous type of
criminal-a modem day monster of sorts.' Over the past 20 years,
states have developed unique criminal and regulatory laws designed
to punish and restrict sex offenders. 2 States continue to expand this
type of legislation in response to increased public fear and outrage-
feelings often provoked by extensive national media coverage that
seems to feature only the most sensational sex crimes.
In addition to requiring sex offenders to register, many states
have enacted laws that allow especially dangerous offenders,
commonly referred to as "sexually violent predators," to be civilly
committed to mental institutions after being released from prison.
States institutionalize sexual predators not as a form of punishment
but rather because these individuals lack control over their behavior
and are often unable to abstain from committing further sex crimes.6
In 2009, the State of Louisiana enacted its own sexual predator
law (SOAP), whereby a "Sex Offender Assessment Panel" must
evaluate each sex offender currently incarcerated in Louisiana and
determine whether he is a "sexually violent predator."7 Instead of
Copyright 2011, by BROCK SKELLEY.
1. See generally Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders
and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 452 (1998).
2. Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REv.
1203 (1998).
3. Catherine Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of
Criminal Laws that Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 31-33 (2010).
4. "Typically, registration laws require a sex offender to provide local law
enforcement officers with his name, local address, nature of offense,
photograph, fingerprints, and dates of incarceration." Carol L. Kunz, Note,
Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control of Sexual Offenders, 47 AM. U. L. REv
453, 457-58 (1997).
5. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
6. Dawn Post, Note, Preventing Victimization: Assessing Future
Dangerousness in Sexual Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil
Commitment, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 177, 201-03 (1999).
7. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.2 (2009). The "sexually violent predator"
is defined as "an offender who has been convicted of a sex offense as defined in
R.S. 15:541 and who has a mental abnormality or antisocial personality disorder
that makes the offender likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses . .
. ." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009).
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resorting to civil commitment, however, the State will place those it
deems predators on standard probation and electronic monitoring.
Standard probation and monitoring are questionable methods
of dealing with Louisiana's most violent sex offenders. Like other
states, Louisiana should confine these individuals and treat them
for their underlying mental conditions. Moreover, unlike civil
commitment, probation is a form of criminal punishment.9 Because
SOAP operates retroactively, its subjection of sexual predators to
punitive probation is a clear violation of the Constitution's
prohibition against ex post facto legislation (i.e., retroactive
criminal laws).' 0 Although the Louisiana Supreme Court recently
held that SOAP does violate the Due Process Clause, it has yet to
address the ex post facto issue.I1
This Comment criticizes SOAP on two separate grounds and
proposes a solution. Part II of this Comment details the substance
of SOAP. Part III then criticizes the law from a public policy and
public safety standpoint. Next, Part IV attacks SOAP as an ex post
facto law-first providing a historical background of the ex post
facto prohibition and its jurisprudential treatment with regard to
the "sexually violent predator" commitment statute (SVPA).
Finally, Part V proposes a method by which the State of Louisiana
can effectively confine and rehabilitate the sexual predator.
Changing the way Louisiana approaches this complex problem is
imperative with regard to both public safety and the protection of
constitutional rights.
II. SOAP: IDENTIFYING AND PUNISHING LOUISIANA'S PREDATORS
In 2009, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal signed into law nine
pieces of legislation intended to "crack down on sexual predators
and help make Louisiana's children safer."' 2 Governor Jindal
emphasized the need for the additional laws, saying "[c]riminals
work quickly to get around the law-and we have to be just as
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009).
9. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (finding that the civil
commitment of a "sexually violent predator" was non-punitive). Hendricks is
discussed infra Part IV. For a discussion of the punitive nature of probation see
infra Part IV.G.3.
10. "No state shall ... pass any .. . ex post facto Law . . . ." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. Louisiana v. Golston, No. 2010-KA-2804, 2011 WL 2586848 (La. July
1, 2011). See infra Part IV.F.
12. Gov. Jindal Signs Package of Bills to Crack Down on Sexual Predators,
Protect Louisiana's Children, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (June 30, 2009), http://
gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfn?md=newsroom&tmp-detail&catlD=2&articlelD=1 3
68&printer-l.
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swift to modify our existing laws and pass new laws to ensure that
our children are kept safe from these monsters."' 3 Among the nine
bills was House Bill 366, which amended and reenacted Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 15:560 and created SOAP4-a
mechanism that now enables courts to place sexual predators on
indefinite probation and electronic monitoring.15
A. SOAP's Purpose
The purpose of SOAP is "to facilitate the identification of those
offenders who are sexually violent predators and child sexual
predators and to require that those offenders register as sex
offenders for life . . . ." SOAP defines a "sexually violent
predator" as "an offender who has been convicted of a sex offense
. . . and who has a mental abnormality or antisocial personality
disorder that makes the offender likely to engage in predatory
sexually violent offenses . . . ."1 SOAP defines a "mental
abnormality" as "a congenital or acquired condition of a person
13. Id. Although Governor Jindal's rhetoric is inspiring and the idea of
cracking down on "monsters" is noble, many of the enactments seem
unnecessary. House Bill 476, for instance, prevents a convicted sex offender
from residing within 1,000 feet of a freestanding video arcade. Such a restriction
may have been valuable 15 years ago, but today it may be difficult to find, much
less reside within 1,000 feet of, a freestanding video arcade.
14. The amendment did not create the SOAP panel, but rather created the
current procedures, including the requirement that the predator be placed on
probation for the remainder of his life.
15. Jindal praised the bill, stating that SOAP panels will now be required to
make recommendations for every sex offender and child predator required to
register in Louisiana. He also emphasized the judiciary's new role in the
process. Every offender deemed to be a predator by the panel will now be
referred back to his sentencing court, which will review the panel's finding and
make a final determination regarding the offender's status. Gov. Jindal Signs
Package of Bills to Crack Down on Sexual Predators, Protect Louisiana's
Children, supra note 12.
16. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560 (2009).
17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009). SOAP defines a "child sexual
predator" as:
a person who has been convicted of a sex offense as defined in R.S.
15:541 and who is likely to engage in additional sex offenses against
children, because he has a mental abnormality or condition which can
be verified by a physician or psychologist, or because he has a history
of committing crimes, wrongs, or acts involving sexually assaultive
behavior or acts which indicate a lustful disposition toward children, as
determined by the court upon receipt and review of relevant
information including the recommendation by the sex offender
assessment panel as provided for by this Chapter.
Id.
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that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a
manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal
sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to the
health and safety of others."' 8
These definitions are not unique to SOAP. Many states use
similar or identical criteria to define the sexual predator and the
mental abnormality.19 Appreciating the characteristics of the sexual
predator, beyond these generalized definitions, is critical to
understanding why SOAP falls short in its attempt to protect the
public from sexual predators.
B. Profile of a "Sexually Violent Predator": Leroy Hendricks
The State of Kansas adopted one of the first sexual predator
commitment laws in the United States.20 In 1994, Leroy Hendricks
became the first sex offender the state classified as a "sexually
violent predator." 21 By 1994, Hendricks had been molesting
children for over 30 years. 2 In 1955, Hendricks pleaded guilty to
indecent exposure after exposing himself to two young girls.2 In
1957 Hendricks was found guilty of "lewdness involving a young
girl." 4 In 1960, "he molested two young boys while he worked for
a carnival" and served two years in prison. Shortly after being
paroled he was arrested again-this time for molesting a seven-
year-old girl.26 Hendricks was then placed in a psychiatric hospital
but was released in 1965 after being deemed safe.27 He was
imprisoned again in 1967 for performing oral sex on an 8-year-old
girl and fondling an 1 1-year-old boy.28 After his release in 1972,
Hendricks immediately began molesting his stepchildren, and then,
18. Id.
19. The Kansas SVPA defines a "sexually violent predator" as "any person
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-29a02 (1994). The Kansas SVPA defines a "mental abnormality" as "a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." Id.
20. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-29a22 (1994).
21. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
22. Id at 353-55.
23. Id. at 354.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id.
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in 1984, he was convicted of taking indecent liberties with two 13-
year-old boys. 29 For this crime, Hendricks served approximately
ten years of his sentence and was to be paroled and released to a
halfway house in 1994.30 The State, however, filed a petition
seekin Hendricks's commitment under the newly enacted
SVPA.
During a trial to determine whether he was a "sexually violent
predator," Hendricks admitted, "when he gets stressed out, he can't
control the urge to molest children." 32 Hendricks recognized that
his behavior was harmful and sincerely hoped he would not molest
another child.33 However, he "stated the only sure way he could
keep from sexually abusing children in the future was 'to die."' 34 A
jury unanimously found that Hendricks was a sexually violent
predator, and, in accordance with the SVPA, the State committed
him to the Lamed State Hospital. 35
C. SOAP's Substance and Procedures
Hendricks could not control his urge to commit sex crimes. 36
This lack of control is what distinguishes him from the standard
sex offender.37 Louisiana's Sex Offender Assessment Panel
attempts to identify individuals who, like Hendricks, lack control
over their behavior and are thus predisposed to committing further
*38
sex cnmes.
SOAP attempts to identify the sexual predator by casting a
wide net. The panel must review every sex offender at least six
months prior to his release from incarceration.39 The panel is
composed of three members: a psychologist, the Secretary of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and the warden of
the prison in which the offender is located.40
29. Id. at 353.
30. Id. at 353-54.
31. Id at 354.
32. Id at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Id at 356. Under the Kansas SVPA, the burden of proof at the trial was
beyond a reasonable doubt. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994).
36. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
37. Id. at 360.
38. The "mental abnormality" affects the "volitional capacity of the person
in a manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual
acts. . . ." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009).
39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.2 (2009).
40. Id. Specifically, the statute provides:
COMMENT 2912011]
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To make its determination, the panel reviews the following:
[P]resentence reports, prison records, medical and
psychological records, information and data gathered by the
staffs of the Board of Pardons and the Board of Parole,
information provided by the convicted offender, the district
attorney, and the assistant district attorney, and any other
information obtained by the boards or the Department of
Public Safety and Corrections.41
If the panel determines the offender may be a sexually violent
predator, it forwards its recommendation to the criminal court that
initially sentenced the offender.42 After a hearing, if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the offender is a "sexually
violent predator," then it must order that he "be supervised by the
division of probation and parole, Department of Public Safety and
Corrections . . . for the duration of his natural life," and upon
release, he must:
1. Register as a sex offender in accordance with the
provisions of R.S. 15:542 et seq. and maintain such registration
for the remainder of his natural life.
2. Provide community notification in accordance with the
provisions of R.S. 15:542 et seq. for the duration of his natural
life.
3. Submit to electronic monitoring pursuant to the provisions
of R.S. 15:560.4 for the duration of his natural life.
4. Report to the probation and parole officer when directed to
do so.
One member shall be either a psychologist licensed by the Louisiana
State Board of Examiners of Psychologists or a medical psychologist
licensed by the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners who has
been engaged in the practice of clinical or counseling psychology for
not less than three consecutive years or a physician in the employ or
under contract to the department whose credentials and experience are
not incompatible with the evaluation of the potential threat to public
safety that may be posed by a sexually violent predator or a child
sexual predator . . . One member shall be the secretary of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections or his designee who shall
be chairman . .. One member shall be the warden, or in his absence the
deputy warden, of the institution where the offender is incarcerated, or
a probation or parole officer with a minimum of ten years experience,
or a retired law enforcement officer with at least five years of
experience in investigating sex offenses.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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5. Not associate with persons known to be engaged in
criminal activities or with persons known to have been
convicted of a felony without written permission of his
probation and parole officer.
6. In all respects, conduct himself honorably, work diligently
at a lawful occupation, and support his dependents, if any, to
the best of his ability.
7. Promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries directed to him
by the probation and parole officer.
8. Live and remain at liberty and refrain from engaging in any
type of criminal conduct.
9. Not have in his possession or control any firearms or
dangerous weapons.
10. Submit to available medical, psychiatric, or mental health
examination and treatment for persons convicted of sex
offenses when deemed appropriate and ordered to do so by the
probation and parole officer.
11. Defray the cost, or any portion thereof, of his supervision
by making payments to the Department of Public Safety and
Corrections in a sum and manner determined by the
department, based on his ability to pay.
12. Submit a residence plan for approval by the probation and
parole officer.
13. Submit himself to continued supervision, either in person
or through remote monitoring, of all of the following Internet-
related activities: (a) The offender's incoming and outgoing
electronic mail and other Internet-based communications,(b) The offender's history of websites visited and the contact
accessed, (c) The periodic unannounced inspection of the
contents of the offender's computer or any other computerized
device or portable media device and the removal of such
information, computer, computer device, or portable media
device to conduct a more thorough inspection.
14. Comply with such other specific conditions as are
appropriate, stated directly, and without ambiguity so as to be
understandable to a reasonable man.43
III. SOAP's FAILURE FROM A PUBLIC POLICY STANDPOINT
These probationary measures fail to protect the public from the
sexual predator. A probation officer is capable only of conducting
periodic supervision, and neither probation nor monitoring can
43. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009).
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prevent a crime before its commission." SOAP's mistaken
assumption seems to be that with probation and monitoring in
place, sexual predators will weigh the consequences of their
actions before offending. However, the State itself has determined
the predator to be mentally abnormal-lacking control over his
urge to re-offend.4 S It is foolish to think that the threat of
imprisonment, or the watchful eye of a probation officer, can
remedy the predator's underlying mental condition-a condition
that affects his volitional capacity.4 6 Because he is mentally
abnormal, the sexual predator is unlikely to assess the potential
consequences of his actions, which predisposes him to the
commission of future sex crimes.47
Moreover, SOAP is ineffective because it fails to place the
predator within a restrictive treatment program or institution.48 All
sex offenders are dangerous, but the sexual predator is dangerous
beyond his control.4 Hendricks, for example, was unable to
control the urge to engage in sexual activity with a child.so The
chief psychologist at the Lamed State Hospital predicted that if
given the opportunity, Hendricks would again engage in predatory
acts against children. 1 The State should not only punish sexual
predators for their crimes but also treat their lingering mental
conditions. And, it is imperative that treatment be coupled with a
degree of confinement or restriction.52
44. See discussion infra Part IV.G.
45. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009).
46. In reality, the only benefit of electronic monitoring and probation is
their potential use in post-crime investigation. If a predator works or resides two
blocks from the scene of a child molestation, investigators can track his
whereabouts at the time of the offense. If they determine that he was at the scene
of the crime, investigators will likely have their culprit. Police will re-arrest the
offender and he will be sent back to prison. This outcome, unfortunately, is a
lose-lose situation. The predator has molested a child, and he is back in prison.
Instead of post-disaster damage control, the goal of SOAP should be to make
sure that that predator is not released from state custody until qualified
professionals deem him safe to be in the community.
47. "Mental abnormality" means a "congenital or acquired condition of a
person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner
that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a
degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of others." LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009) (emphasis added).
48. This failure is also pertinent to the question of whether SOAP is an ex
post facto law. See discussion infra Part IV.
49. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
50. Id. at 355.
51. Id.at355n.2.
52. See discussion infra Part V.
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SOAP's lack of proactive prevention and treatment places the
public at risk. For example, suppose that a classified sexual
predator encounters a child while working-a situation likely to
occur given that a predator must work somewhere, and in doing so,
will likely at some point encounter a child.53 Suppose now the
predator gratifies his uncontrollable desire to re-offend, a
propensity the State knows he possesses 54 What good now can the
probation and electronic monitoring accomplish? The police can
track the predator's whereabouts at the time of the offense and
determine that he was the culprit, but what then? The predator has
already violated the child-the very thing SOAP aims to prevent.5 5
Given that SOAP purportedly identifies the violent predator
before he is released from prison, it seems only logical that the
State would create a program whereby the predator is confined-
perhaps in a mental institution.56 More importantly, the State
should provide him with treatment for the abnormality that makes
him dangerous in the first place. But instead, SOAP requires only
that he wear a monitoring device and that a probation officer keep
an eye on him.
IV. SOAP's VIOLATION OF THE Ex POST FACTO PROHIBITION
In addition to being an ineffective method of dealing with the
sexual predator, probation is a form of punishment. 57 Because the
provisions of SOAP apply to all sex offenders regardless of when
they committed their respective crimes, the provisions are
retroactive.5 8 The United States Constitution's Ex Post Facto
Clause strictly prohibits retroactive criminal legislation, and
53. Predators on SOAP probation must "work diligently at a lawful
occupation." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009).
54. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009) (A mental abnormality "affects
the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes
that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts . . . .").
55. Obviously, catching the sexual predator after he has committed a crime
is better than not catching him at all. However, SOAP is not an investigative
tool. It is a preventative measure. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560 (2009)
("[i]n consideration of the potentially high rate of recidivism and the harm
which can be done to the most defenseless members of the public by sexually
violent predators. . . .") (emphasis added).
56. See discussion infra Part V.
57. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (finding that
"[p]robation, like incarceration, is 'a form of criminal sanction imposed by a
court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty."') (citing
KILLINGER, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14
(1976)); see also discussion infra Part IV.G.3.
58. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560 (2009) (the panel is required to evaluate
every incarcerated sex offender, regardless of when he was convicted).
2011] 295
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therefore SOAP should be declared unconstitutional on ex post
facto grounds.
A. The Nature and Operation of the Ex Post Facto Clause
The prohibition against ex post facto laws is found in Article I of
the U.S. Constitution and provides: "No state shall ... pass any ...
ex post facto Law . . . . In Calder v. Bull, Chief Justice John
Marshall articulated precisely which laws the Clause prohibits:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment,
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the
offender.60
The ex post facto prohibition serves two purposes: It ensures
fair notice regarding which types of conduct will be punished,6'
and it prevents legislators from creating laws that are "arbitrary
and vindictive." 62 One scholar eloquently summarized the "type"
of citizen who has invoked ex post facto challenges throughout
American history, saying: "Over the centuries, the [Ex Post Facto]
Clause has been invoked by a veritable 'who's who' of scorned
Americans-from supporters of the Confederacy in the late 1860s,
to immi ants in the late 1800s, to Communist sympathizers in the
1950s."
Courts have interpreted the Ex Post Facto Clause as applying
exclusively to "penal" or "criminal" statutes. 64 Stated differently,
the Clause does not apply to statutes that are "civil" or
59. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
60. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
61. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977) ("[F]air warning
of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties is fundamental to our
concept of constitutional liberty.").
62. Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of
Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1261, 1277 (1998).
63. Id. at 1267.
64. Cal. Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995) (citing
Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937)).
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"regulatory" in nature. 65 The distinguishing element of a criminal
statute is the imposition of punishment.66  Therefore, to
successfully attack a law on ex post facto grounds, the defendant
must show that the law applies retroactively and imposes a form of
punishment. Because retroactivity is readily identifiable, 6 7 the
point of contention in ex post facto challenges virtually always
concerns whether a particular mechanism constitutes punishment.68
B. The Jurisprudence ofPunishment
Whether a given law imposes punishment69 is critical not only
for ex post facto issues but also for issues of due process, double
jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment.70 The United States
Supreme Court has developed a jurisprudential test to aid in the
determination of whether a particular law is punitive. The
"intent/effects" test begins with the premise that "whether a
particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter
of statutory construction."7 The first inquiry is "whether [the
legislature], in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated
either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the
65. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (where the Court sought to
determine "whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil
proceedings").
66. See Logan, supra note 62, at 1280.
67. A law is retroactive if it changes the consequences of a crime after it
was committed. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) ("A law is
retrospective if it 'changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its
effective date') (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981)).
68. Logan, supra note 62, at 1280-82.
69. An inquiry similar to whether a law is punitive is the question of
whether a particular law establishes criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Smith, 538
U.S. at 92 ("The framework for our inquiry, however, is well established. We
must 'ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil
proceedings.' If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that
ends the inquiry.") (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
70. Logan, supra note 62, at 1280 ("Whether a given legislative enactment
imposes 'punishment' is a matter of threshold constitutional significance,
potentially triggering not just the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but
also those of a broad array of other constitutional provisions as well."); see also
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (Double Jeopardy Clause); Austin
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth
Amendment); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (Due Process
Clause of Fifth Amendment); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (Bill
of Attainder Clause); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
(Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of Eighth Amendment).
71. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
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other." 72 If the legislature explicitly intended to institute criminal
proceedings, the inquiry ends, and the Court will hold the law
unconstitutional.73 If, however, the legislature intended to establish
civil proceedings, the Court will "ordinarily defer to the
legislature's stated intent." 74  The Court will override the
legislature's intent only if the "statutory scheme is so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to deem
it 'civil."'
In determining whether a law's effects are punitive, the Court
has applied a set of factors that it first articulated in Kennedy v.
Mendoza:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as
a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.
72. Id. (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
236-37 (1972)).
73. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93.
74. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
75. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
Clearly, the "intent/effects" test weighs in favor of the state, and one can argue
that it merely provides lawmakers a guide to drafting retroactive legislation. On
its face, no matter how punitive a piece of legislation may seem, by labeling it as
"civil," it is automatically cloaked with a protective "heavy burden," which the
law's opponent must overcome. Id.
76. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The
statute at issue in Mendoza provided for the loss of citizenship for draft dodgers.
Id. at 146. The provision applied to those who had dodged the draft and who,
from within 60 days of the enactment, did not return. Id. at 171. The Court
rejected the argument that the statute was prospective, because it applied "only
on those who have deserted and who shall not return within sixty days." Id.
Interestingly, in Mendoza, the Court never applied the factors, finding instead
that the statute at issue had a punitive purpose:
[A]lthough we are convinced that application of these criteria to the
face of the statutes supports the conclusion that they are punitive, a
detailed examination along such lines is unnecessary, because the
objective manifestations of congressional purpose indicate conclusively
that the provisions in question can only be interpreted as punitive.
Id. at 169.
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Over the past 50 4ears, the Court has applied the Mendoza
factors inconsistently. What is clear, however, is that the Court
will give great weight to legislative labels, especially when
reviewing retroactive sex offender legislation.
C. SOAP's Legislative Ancestor: The Sexually Violent Predator
Statute (SVPA)
In the 1990s, states began creating legislation that would allow
them to place sexual predators in mental institutions after serving
their entire prison sentence. Thus far, the United States Supreme
Court has found these laws to be non-punitive under the
"intents/effects" test.79 Although standard SVPAs are similar to
SOAP, the history and purpose of these laws demonstrate that
probation, unlike civil commitment, is punitive.
In the early 20th century, states began diverting sex offenders
from the criminal justice system and committing them to
institutions through the enactment of "sex psychopath statutes."80
During this time, the criminal justice system and the mental health
profession often viewed sex offenders as unable to control their
sexually deviant impulses.8 1 In light of this perception, courts often
considered sex offenders insane and therefore exempt from
criminal prosecution. 82 Frequently, a state would convict sex
offenders for their crimes, but admit them to institutions for
* * 83treatment in lieu of incarceration.
The trend of viewing the sex offender as mentally ill continued
throughout the 1960s. By the 1980s, however, state legislatures
began to re-examine the way in which the justice system dealt with
sex crimes, and the idea that sex offenses were the product of
mental disease gradually faded.85 The new school of thought is that
77. Logan, supra note 62, at 1280 (finding that "the Supreme Court's case
law on the punishment question in recent times has been so inconsistent that it
borders on the unintelligible, evidencing a decidedly circular, at times patently
result-driven effort to distinguish whether a sanction is 'civil' or 'criminal,'
'preventive' or 'punitive,' 'regulatory' or 'retributive"').
78. Id. at 1288-89.
79. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
80. Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sex
Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime
Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897-98 (1995).
81. Id. at 899.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 905.
85. Id.
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sex offenders are criminals who need to be punished.86 In addition
to statutorily prescribed punishments, today's sex offenders are
subject to a variety of non-criminal restrictions, including civil
commitment for the most violent offenders.
Washington was the first state to enact a post-prison sentence
commitment procedure for the "sexually violent predator." 7 Many
states have since enacted similar statutes.88 These laws differ from
the traditional "sex psychopath statutes" of the 1960s and 70s in
two main respects. First, SVPA laws do not require that the
individual suffer from a distinct and recognized mental illness.8 9
For instance, Kansas's SVPA requires only that the individual be
"likely to engage in 'predatory acts of violence"' as the result of
either a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder." 90 Second,
SVPA proceedings generally take place after the offender has
served his prison sentence. 91 The Court has affirmed the
constitutionality of traditional sex offender commitment laws. 92
86. Id. at 906.
87. John Q. La Fond, The Cost of Enacting A Sexual Predator Law, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 468, 475 (1998).
88. See Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and
the Requirement of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1383, 1400 n.142
(2008); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-3701-36-3716), California (CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-929),
Illinois (725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207), Iowa (IOWA CODE § 229A),
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 6, §§ 178C-178P), Minnesota (MINN.
STAT. § 253B.185 & 253B.02, subdiv. 18b & 18c), Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 632.480-513), New Jersey (N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-27.26), North Dakota
(N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-10),
Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §
37.1-70 (1950), as amended), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. CH. 980)).
89. Cf Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). In Allen, the Court upheld
Illinois' more traditional commitment procedure for sexual dangerous persons-
a procedure which required the finding of a "mental illness," stating:
the initial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding is very different
from the central issue in either a delinquency proceeding or a criminal
prosecution. ... Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to
either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists
and psychologists.
Id. at 37 1.
90. The Kansas SVPA defines "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
91. Blacher, supra note 80, at 912.
92. See Allen, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of
Illinois's Sexually Dangerous Person Act).
The aforementioned distinctions, however, prompted its review of
Kansas's modem SVPA.9 3
D. The Constitutionality of the Kansas SVPA
After the State of Kansas committed Leroy Hendricks to the
Lamed State Hospital, Hendricks appealed to the Kansas Supreme
Court, arguing that the SVPA "violated the Federal Constitution's
Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses."94 The
Kansas Supreme Court did not decide the ex post facto or double
jeopardy claims, but reversed on the due process claim, declaring
that "in order to commit a person involuntarily in a civil
proceeding, the state is required by 'substantive' due process to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person is both (1)
mentally ill, and (2) a danger to himself or others." 95 The Kansas
Supreme Court found the statutory term "mental abnormality" to
be insufficient with regard to the Constitutional requirement that
Hendricks be "mentally ill."96 The State of Kansas appealed, and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.9 7
Kansas v. Hendricks: Due Process and Ex Post Facto Analysis
The Court's due process analysis in Hendricks centered on the
nature of the "mental abnormality." Kansas argued that "the Act's
definition of 'mental abnormality' satisflied] 'substantive' due
process requirements." 98 The Court agreed, finding
[s]tates have in certain narrow circumstances provided for
the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to
control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the
public health and safety [,] . . . [and] [w]e have consistently
upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and
evidentiary standards.99
The Court first noted that civil commitment proceedings
commenced only when a person "'has been convicted of or
charged with a sexually violent offense' and 'suffers from a mental
93. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
94. Id. at 356.
95. Id. (quoting the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in In re Hendricks,
912 P. 2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996)).
96. Id. at 350.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 356.
99. Id. at 357 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
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abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely
to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence."' 00 In the Court's
view, the prior charge or conviction satisfied the due process
requirement that the offender be dangerous to himself or others.' 0'
However, the Court acknowledged that a "finding of
dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient round
upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment."' Civil
commitments require "proof of some additional factor, such as a
'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality' . . . [that] serve[s] to limit
involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.",1
03
Hendricks argued that, historically, commitment statutes
require a medically accepted form of mental illness and that "a
'mental abnormality' [was] not equivalent to a 'mental illness'
because it [was] a term coined by the Kansas Legislature, rather
than by the psychiatric community." 04 Rejecting this argument,
the Court asserted that it had "never required state legislatures to
adopt anyparticular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment
statutes." The requirement of a "mental abnormality" was
satisfactory because it was illustrative of a state of mind that made
it "difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his
dangerous behavior."10 This characteristic was adequate to
distinguish Hendricks "from other dangerous persons who are
perhaps more oproperly dealt with exclusively through criminal
proceedings."'
The Court also granted Hendricks's petition to determine
whether the Act should be invalidated on ex post facto grounds.
Hendricks claimed that the proceedins were criminal and being
confined to a hospital was punishment. 8 To determine the validity
of his argument, the Court applied the "intent/effects" test to the
100. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 357-58.
102. Id at 358.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 359 (emphasis added). For this argument, Hendricks cited to both
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), and Foucha, 504 U.S. 71.
105. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
106. Id. at 358.
107. Id. at 360.
108. Id. at 361. "The thrust of Hendricks' argument is that the Act establishes
criminal proceedings; hence confinement under it necessarily constitutes
punishment. He contends that where, as here, newly enacted 'punishment' is
predicated upon past conduct for which he has already been convicted and
forced to serve a prison sentence, the Constitution's Double Jeopardy and Ex
Post Facto Clauses are violated." Id.
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Act.109 The Court sought first to "ascertain whether the legislature
meant the statute to establish 'civil' [or 'criminal']
proceedings.""i0 With little discussion, it found that Kansas's
objective was to create a civil proceeding. The Court's conclusion
was, in large part, due to the Act's location in the Kansas probate
code instead of the criminal code and additionally because the
legislature described the Act as creating a "civil commitment
procedure.""I
With respect to the "effects" portion of the test, the Court
applied several of the Mendoza factors-first stating that the Act
"does not implicate either of the two primary objectives of criminal
punishment: retribution or deterrence."' The Court did not
consider the Act retributive because it did not affix culpability to
prior criminal conduct, but instead used past convictions solely for
evidentiary purposes.' "3 More specifically, the past crimes were
used either to demonstrate that a "mental abnormality" existed or
to support a finding of future dangerousness.1 14 Moreover, the Act
did not "make a criminal conviction a prerequisite for
commitment-persons absolved of criminal responsibility [were]
nonetheless ... subject to confinement under the Act."" 5
The Court also emphasized the distinction between
confinement in an institution and confinement in a prison:
[T]he conditions surrounding that confinement do not
suggest a punitive purpose on the State's part. The State
has represented that an individual confined under the Act is
not subject to the more restrictive conditions placed on
state prisoners, but instead experiences essentially the same
conditions as any involuntarily committed patient in the
state mental institution. Because none of the parties argues
that people institutionalized under the Kansas general civil
109. Id.
110. Id.
1 11. Id.
112. Id. at 361-62.
113. Id. at 362. The Court found that the Act did not have a deterring effect
because "[t]hose persons committed under the Act are, by definition, suffering
from a 'mental abnormality' or a 'personality disorder' that prevents them from
exercising adequate control over their behavior. Such persons are therefore
unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement." Id. at 362-363.
114. Id.at362.
115. Id. (citing to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a) (1994)). The Court also
found that "unlike a criminal statute, no finding of scienter is required to commit
an individual who is found to be a sexually violent predator; instead, the
commitment determination is made based on a 'mental abnormality' or
'personality disorder' rather than on one's criminal intent." Id.
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commitment statute are subject to punitive conditions, even
though they may be involuntarily confined, it is difficult to
conclude that persons confined under this Act are being
punished.116
Finally, Hendricks argued the Act was punitive because it
failed to offer "legitimate treatment . .. [and that] [w]ithout such
treatment ... confinement under the Act amount[ed] to little more
than disguised punishment."" 7 The Court rejected this argument
because it was premised on the assumption that Hendricks's
condition was treatable and that the State had simply failed (or
refused) to treat him.18 Instead, the Court accepted the Kansas
Supreme Court's conclusion that "treatment for sexually violent
predators is all but nonexistent"ll 9 and held that the U.S.
Constitution does not prevent states from "civilly detaining those
for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a
danger to others."l 20
The ex post facto holding in Hendricks is narrow and can be
summarized as follows: A state does not inflict punishment when it
civilly commits sex offenders who are a danger to society and
"who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control." 2 1
E. SOAP: From Civil Commitment to Simple Probation
SOAP is similar to the Kansas SVPA in several respects. Its
definition of a "sexually violent predator" and "mental abnormality"
are the same. 122 The critical difference is that SOAP places the
predator on probation, instead of committing him to an institution.
Clearly, probation has the advantage of being inexpensive when
116. Id. at 362-3 (internal citations omitted). The Court also rejected two
other arguments, by which Hendricks claimed that the Act was punitive: (1) the
indefinite status of commitment, id. at 363-64 (finding that "commitment under
the Act is only potentially indefinite" and that "[t]he maximum amount of time
an individual can be incapacitated pursuant to a single judicial proceeding is one
year"); and (2) that "the State's use of procedural safeguards traditionally found
in criminal trials makes the proceedings here criminal rather than civil," id at
364-65 (finding that Kansas's choice to afford such procedural protections does
not transform a civil commitment proceeding into a criminal prosecution)
(internal citations omitted).
117. Id. at 365.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 366.
121. Id. at 347.
122. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a)-(b) (1994).
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compared to civil commitment.123 With probation, the State is able
to monitor the sexual predator but is relieved of the costly duty to
provide an environment conducive to mental health.
Interestingly, recent failed legislative proposals indicate that if
not for financial obstacles, Governor Jindal and the Louisiana
Legislature would prefer a procedure whereby violent predators are
properly confined and treated. In 2004, Louisiana Senate Bill 485
provided for a traditional sex offender commitment procedure:
The legislature finds that there exists a small but extremely
dangerous number of sexually violent predators who,
because of a mental abnormality, are likely to commit a sex
offense if not treated for their mental abnormality. The
legislature further finds that because the current judicial
commitment procedure under R.S. 28:54 et seq. is intended
to provide short-term treatment to individuals with serious
mental disorders, it is inadequate to address the special
needs of sexually violent predators and the risk they present
to society. Therefore, the legislature determines that a
separate involuntary civil commitment process for the
potentially long-term control, care, and treatment of
sexually violent predators is necessary. 124
The Legislature, however, abandoned the effort due to its
astronomical costs. 12 5
Subsequently, in 2009, House Bill 713 proposed the creation of
"Treatment Review Committees" that would identify the "sexually
dangerous person."l26 Unlike a standard SVPA, House Bill 713
would obligate predators to "participate in mandatory treatment"
after being released from prison.12 The proponent of the bill,
Representative Fred Mills, voluntarily deferred the legislation in
light of an estimate that the program would cost at least $12
123. According to a recent news article on civil commitment:
[A]nnual costs per offender topped out at $175,000 in New York and
$173,000 in California, and averaged $96,000 a year, about double what
it would cost to send them to an Ivy League university. In some states,
like Minnesota, sex offender treatment costs more than five times more
than keeping offenders in prison. And those estimates do not include the
considerable legal expenses necessary to commit someone.
Sex Offender Confinement Costing States Too Much, CBS NEWS (June 22, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/22/national/main6605890.shtml.
124. S.B. 485, 2004 Reg. Session (La. 2004).
125. Sex Offender Confinement Costing States Too Much, CBS NEWS (June
22, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/22/national/main6605890.
shtml.
126. H.B. 713, 2009 Reg. Session (La. 2009).
127. Id.
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million over five years.' 2 8 Mills initially believed the program
would cost approximately $26,000 per offender each year. A
revised estimate put this cost closer to $30,000 per year.129
Based on these proposals, it is clear that if money were not a
factor, Louisiana lawmakers would choose to place sexual predators
in restrictive environments where they could receive treatment. The
State's attempt to save money is commendable. Aside from being
ineffective, however, SOAP raises constitutional issues that cannot
be disregarded in light of financial concerns. Because SOAP
operates retroactively, it implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause. An
analysis of SOAP strongly suggests that it creates criminal
proceedings and imposes punishment. This, in combination with its
retroactive effect, makes SOAP an ex post facto law.
F. Louisiana v. Golston
In Golston, several sex offenders challenged the constitutionality
of SOAP, alleging it violated both the Due Process and Ex Post
Facts Clauses. With regard to the due process claim, the trial
court agreed, finding SOAP "failed to meet the requirements of due
process because of vagueness caused by its failure to set forth
standards to enable sex offenders to protect themselves against
arbitrary and discriminatory forfeiture of property and liberty."' 3 '
The Court, however, declined to rule on the ex post facto issue,
saying only that it "was hesitant ... to label [SOAP's] restrictions as
merely regulatory, and not punitive, in nature. But [that] having
found the statute to be void for vagueness, it [was] not necessary ...
to explore possible constitutional deficiencies regarding ex post
facto application." 32
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. The Court applied
Hendricks and found that because SOAP provides the same
definitions as the Kansas SVPA, it satisfies due process.133
128. Michelle Millhollon, Lawmaker Kills Sex-Offender Program Plan, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), May 27, 2009.
129. The failed legislation was supposed to be a key component of Bobby
Jindal's 2009 package of sex offender laws. Governor Jindal, however,
supported Mills in withdrawing the legislation until the costs could be brought
down. Id. (Jindal stated that "[a]s the state faces multiyear budget challenges, we
support Representative Mills' efforts to present a more cost-effective approach
on this legislation and appreciate his tireless work on the bill.").
130. Louisiana v. Golston, No. 2010-KA-2804, 2011 WL 2586848, at *9
(La. July 1, 2011).
131. Id.at*ll.
132. Louisiana v. Golston, No. 01-98-0002, slip op. at 12 (La. Jud. Dist. Ct.
19th Oct. 8, 2010).
133. Golston,2011 WL2586848, at *19.
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Specifically, it reasoned that "[t]he definitions and criteria provide
sufficient constitutional protections to subject an individual to
involuntary civil commitment under the holdings of Hendricks ...
and the SOAP scheme re uirements are considerably less severe
than civil commitments."' Unfortunately, the trial court's failure
to address the ex post facto challenge allowed the Court to avoid
the more difficult question of whether SOAP imposes punishment.
In this regard, Hendricks is not dispositive-civil commitment is
vastly different from probation and requires an independent ex post
facto analysis.135
G. Ex Post Facto Analysis
In the ex post facto context, the conclusion that a particular law
is civil or criminal is somewhat superficial. The essential
determination is whether it imposes punishment.136  The
determination of punishment, however, is predicated on questions
of legislative intent, criminal/civil labels, and practical effects. The
Kansas SVPA, for example, did not create criminal proceedings,
and its commitment of sexual predators did not constitute
punishment.1 37 Because it was not punitive, its retroactive
application did not constitute a violation of the ex post facto
prohibition.' 38 A similar determination must be made with respect
to SOAP: whether Louisiana may, instead of commitment, place a
sexual predator on standard probation without effectively imposing
additional punishment on the predator.
Application of the "intent/effects" test demonstrates that SOAP
imposes punishment. First, the Louisiana Legislature has provided
no indication that it intended for SOAP proceedings to be civil, i.e.
non punitive.' 39 Second, SOAP's process of assessment amounts to
nothing more than a prediction of recidivism, which is indicative
134. Id. at *21.
135. For example, in Hendricks the Court addressed the ex post facto
argument separately from the due process argument.
136. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003) (where Justice Kennedy
framed the core inquiry posed by Alaska's registration statute, saying: "We must
decide whether the registration requirement is a retroactive punishment
prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause.").
137. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) ("We therefore hold that
the Act does not establish criminal proceedings and that involuntary
confinement pursuant to the Act is not punitive. Our conclusion that the Act is
nonpunitive thus removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double
jeopardy and ex post facto claims.").
138. Id.
139. This is the first part of the "intents/effects" test. See Hendricks, 521 U.S.
at 361.
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of a punitive intent. And third, the imposition of standard probation
is a traditional form of punishment.14
1. Legislative Intent Underlying SOAP
In determining whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal,
the first question is "whether the legislature, in establishing the
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other."' 4' For example, in
Hendricks, the Court looked to the express language of the statue
to identify the legislature's preference:
The legislature finds that there exists an extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators . . . who are
likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence if not
treated for their mental abnormality or personality disorder
.... [T]he legislature determines that a separate involuntary
civil commitment process for the potentially long-term
control, care and treatment of sexually violent predators is
necessary. 42
Unlike the Kansas SVPA, which clearly sets out an overriding
concern (sexual predators), a state interest (public safety), and a
remedial action (civil commitment), SOAP fails to clearly
articulate a justification for its imposition of probation and
electronic monitoring. The only remedial action clearly justified by
the legislative text is the requirement that predators register for life
pursuant to Louisiana's registration and notification statute:
The legislature finds that sexually violent predators and
child sexual predators often pose a high risk of engaging in
sex offenses . . . . Therefore, it is the policy of this state to
facilitate the identification of those offenders who are
140. According to the majority opinion in Hendricks, a finding that
punishment is implicated may be sufficient to declare legislation ex post facto,
assuming it applies retroactively. See id. at 369. ("We therefore hold that the Act
does not establish criminal proceedings and that involuntary confinement
pursuant to the Act is not punitive. Our conclusion that the Act is nonpunitive
thus removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double jeopardy and
ex post facto claims.").
141. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93.
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 93
(stating that the legislation at issue expressly declared that: (1) "Sex offenders
pose a high risk of reoffending"; (2) "protecting the public from sex offenders"
is a "primary governmental interest"; and (3) "release of certain information
about sex offenders to public agencies and the general public will assist in
protecting the public safety").
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sexually violent predators . . . and to require that those
offenders register as sex offenders for life . . . .143
The "findings" completely fail to mention or justify the 14
probationary restrictions.'" Moreover, a review of SOAP's
legislative history, chronologically, demonstrates that the
justifications provided in the "findings" do not even contemplate
that the "sexually violent predator" will be placed on probation. 14 5
The Legislature first created SOAP panels in 2006.146 However,
the original legislation required only that sexual predators abide by
life-long registration requirements and electronic monitoring. 147In
2009, the Legislature drastically altered SOAP to include, among
other things, an additional 14 probation requirements.148 But the
Legislature left its "findings" unchanged.
Thus, as written today, the legislative findings do not
contemplate a requirement of probation. Therefore, one cannot infer
that the Legislature has, expressly or impliedly, communicated a
labeling preference with regards to the amended proceedings.
In Mendoza, the Court stated that "[a]bsent conclusive evidence
of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute, [the
punitive characteristics of the statute] must be considered in relation
to the statute on its face."' 4 9 Probation itself is punishment. 5 o
Additionally, the entire assessment process under SOAP-and the
subsequent court proceeding-constitutes nothing more than a
prediction of future dangerousness based on the offender's past
crimes.
2. SOAP's Punitive Process: Re-Sentencing the Offender Based
on Future Dangerousness
Because the SOAP panel is incapable of identifying a "mental
abnormality," SOAP's assessment process amounts to nothing
more than a prediction of recidivism or future dangerousness. In
Hendricks, the Court held that a proceeding that solely predicts
"future dangerousness" is criminal in character:
143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560 (2009).
144. Further, although the statute does claim an interest in "monitoring those
offenders who pose the greatest risk to the health and safety of our citizens," it is
unclear whether this refers to electronic monitoring or monitoring that is
incidental to life-long registration. Id.
145. Id.
146. Act No. 186, 2006 La. Acts 1184.
147. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560 (2006) (amended 2009).
148. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009).
149. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
150. See discussion infra Part IV.G.3.
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The [Kansas SVPA] requires . . . evidence of past sexually
violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates
a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not
incapacitated .... This admitted lack of volitional control,
coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness,
adequately distinguishes [the sexually violent predator] from
other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly
dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.
There are currently over 4,000 sex offenders in the Louisiana
Department of Corrections, and all 4,000 will be subject to
assessment.152 To require evaluation, the offender need not show
any signs of an abnormality or a lack of control. The offender is at
a clear disadvantage at the outset of the proceeding3 because the
State has already labeled him a sex offender. Moreover,
Louisiana's sex offender registration law declares that all "sex
offenders, sexually violent predators, and child predators often
pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses . . . after being
released from incarceration."' Thus, according to the State, every
sex offender, regardless of whether he is a violent predator, is
likely to re-offend. Apparently, the duty of the panel is to
determine which offenders are likely to re-offend because of a
"mental abnormality."
In light of these meaningless semantics, it is truly disturbing that
the panel has almost no criteria or guidelines by which to identify a
true "mental abnormality." At a recent hearing on a motion to
declare SOAP unconstitutional, Dr. Susan Tucker, a psychologist
who has sat on several SOAP panels, testified to the insufficiency
151. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-60 (1997) (emphasis added).
152. Demographic Profiles of the Sex Offenders in Custody Correctional
Population, LA. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS (Mar. 31, 2010),
available at http://www.corrections.state.1a.us/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/2i3.
pdf. The broad application of SOAP hints at a punitive motive on the part of the
State. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 109 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing the
broad application of Alaska's sex offender registration law, saying, "[t]he fact
that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone, probably sweeping in a
significant number of people who pose no real threat to the community, serves
to feed suspicion that something more than regulation of safety is going on;
when a legislature uses prior convictions to impose burdens that outpace the
law's stated civil aims, there is room for serious argument that the ulterior
purpose is to revisit past crimes, not prevent future ones.").
153. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.2(F) (2009). SOAP declares that
"sexually violent predators . .. often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses
... after being released from incarceration." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560
(2009).
154. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:540 (language which is identical to the
language found under SOAP).
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and arbitrariness of the panel's method of assessment.'5 5 Dr. Tucker
complained of having minimal information and admitted that,
although qualified to do so, she could not, in her capacity as a
psychologist, evaluate all offenders.156 Dr. Tucker admitted that she
has seen less than 10% of the offenders she has assessed.'5 7 She also
conceded that the prudent thing to do would be to conduct an
independent evaluation of each offender. 5 8 When asked if she could
identify a "mental abnormality" given the current procedures, Dr.
Tucker responded "absolutely not." 59 She also stated that, when in
doubt, she simply errs on the side of public safety.' 60 Ultimately, Dr.
Tucker's testimony reveals that the panel is assessing offenders
based on their generalized risks rather than assessing them for a true
"mental abnormality."
a. The "Mental Abnormality" and the Panel's Lack of
Qualification
Even assuming the Legislature provided the panel with
sufficient direction and criteria by which to identify a "mental
abnormality," its lay members are nonetheless unqualified to
assess the offender's mental condition. In Hendricks, the Court
found the term "mental abnormality" sufficient to identify
individuals suffering from conditions that rendered them
"dangerous beyond their control."162 Conceding that the term itself
was not precise, the Court emphasized the need for states to
broadly define what constitutes a sufficient mental condition,
saying, "we have never required state legislatures to adopt any
particular nomenclature . .. . Rather, we have traditionally left to
legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have
legal significance." 63 The Court, however, did not suggest that
states might restrict an individual's freedom by applying arbitrary
criteria with no medical significance.
Outside of the criminal context, states may only impose non-
punitive restrictions, like civil commitment, when there is "some
155. Transcript of Hearing at 20-22, Louisiana v. Golston, No. 01-98-0002
(La. Jud. Dist. Ct. 19th Sept. 28, 2010).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 43.
159. Id. at 50.
160. Id. at 40.
161. By "lay members" it is meant that two of the three individuals on the
panel are not mental health professionals.
162. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
163. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
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medical justification for doing so."' 64 There is no medical
justification under SOAP because two-thirds of the panel consist of
the warden and the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety
and Corrections-two individuals who have absolutely no medical
or psychological expertise. And yet, the warden and the Secretary
could constitute a majority for purposes of forwarding a
recommendation to the sentencing court.165 If two lay individuals
may diagnose a "mental abnormality," the term necessarily lacks
any degree of medical significance, and instead, is only an
assessment of future dangerousness.
b. Same Court, Same Judge, New Punishment
After the panel makes its unguided and arbitrary prediction, the
offender is injected back into the criminal justice system.' 66 The
process the offender undergoes resembles a second criminal
proceeding. If the panel determines that the offender may be a
sexual predator, it forwards its recommendation to the court that
initially sentenced the offender.'6 7 The procedure is circular-a
criminal court convicts and sentences the offender; he then serves
his time in prison; and he once again returns to that same court,
now with the possibility of being placed on indefinite probation. In
the second proceeding, the judge is expected to play the role of
psychologist and determine whether a three-member panel
correctly "diagnosed" the offender.' 68 The offender, however, has
not received a true psychological assessment. Moreover, the statute
itself does not mandate the use of expert testimony, nor does it
give the offender the right to cross-examine members of the
panel. 169 So, at no point is the judge obligated to hear from a
mental health professional who has personally evaluated the
offender. The judge, therefore, has no more guidance than the
panel in determining whether the offender has a "mental
abnormality." Unless the judge receives conflicting testimony, he
must resort to a basic risk assessment, asking only whether the
offender is likely to commit another sex offense.
164. Id. at 359 (emphasis added) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
165. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.2 (2009).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. At least there is no indication that the offender is entitled to cross-
examine members of the panel. Under the Kansas SVPA, offenders were given
the right to cross-examine the professionals who diagnosed them. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a05 (1994).
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The above characteristics alone are sufficient to label SOAP as
a criminal proceeding. When combined with SOAP's punitive
"effects," the criminal label is even more fitting.
3. Determining SOAP's Punitive "Effects" Under Mendoza
The "effect" of a court deeming an offender to be a sexual
predator is life-long probation administered by the Louisiana
Department of Corrections.'70 Under the Mendoza factors, this
"effect" is punitive for four reasons: (1) probation has been
historically regarded as punishment, (2) it imposes affirmative
disability and restraint, (3) it promotes retribution within the
context of the proceedings, and (4) it does not have a rational
connection to a non-punitive purpose.' 7 '
a. Probation's Role in the Criminal Justice System.
Probation has historically been regarded as punishment.
Probation, like incarceration, is 'a form of criminal sanction
imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of
guilty. Louisiana's conditions of standard criminal probation are
largely identical to those SOAP imposes.173 Moreover, the
Louisiana Department of Corrections administers both "types" of
probation, a fact which indicates that SOAP is punitive.174
b. SOAP Imposes an Affirmative Disability and Restraint7 5
When analyzing whether a penalizing mechanism imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint, the relevant inquiry is "how the
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009).
171. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (considering these four
Mendoza factors to be the "most relevant to [the] analysis").
172. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (internal citations
omitted).
173. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895 (2010) (conditions of
probation).
174. In Hendricks, Justice Thomas gave significant weight to the fact that the
Kansas SVPA was administered by the Department of Social Services and not
the Department of Corrections, saying: "What is significant, however, is that
Hendricks was placed under the supervision of the Kansas Department of Health
and Social and Rehabilitative Services, housed in a unit segregated from the
general prison population and operated not by employees of the Department of
Corrections, but by other trained individuals." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 368 (1997).
175. Mendoza, 372 U.S. at 168.
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effects of the Act are felt by those subject to it."' In Smith v. Doe,
the United States Supreme Court analyzed the disability imposed
on sex offenders by the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act. The
respondent argued that the statutory requirements of registration
and notification were analogous to those of criminal probation. 7 7
The Court disagreed, finding that offenders subject to the Alaska
statute "are free to move where they wish and to live and work as
other citizens, with no supervision,"' 7 8 and that registration is not
parallel to probation in terms of its restraint, because, unlike
registration, "[p]robation and supervised release entail a series of
mandatory conditions." 79
Clearly, the opposite is true with respect to SOAP-where the
predator is on probation and cannot live and work as other citizens
do.' 8 0 The sexual predator must report to his probation officer
without exception, seek permission to associate with those who
have been convicted of a felony, wear an electronic monitorin
device, and have his probation officer approve his residence.1n
This series of mandatory conditions is analogous to criminal
probation and supervised release.' 82
In Louisiana v. Trosclair, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal found similar conditions to be punitive.'8 3 In Trosclair,
the statute in question was Louisiana Revised Statutes section
15:561, which, in part, provides that "[a] person convicted on or
after August 15, 2006, of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541
when the victim is under the age of thirteen years shall be placed
upon supervised release . . . whenever he is released from the
custody . . . ."184 The statute imposes 17 conditions of supervised
176. Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-100.
177. Id. at 101.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009).
181. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009). Regarding the monitoring
device, one may argue that merely wearing an electronic device does not impose
upon a person an affirmative disability or restraint. From a literal standpoint, the
monitor does not prevent freedom of movement. Looking deeper, however, the
imposition of bodily intrusion is surely a form of disability. Forcing someone to
wear an electronic monitoring device, where the failure to comply will result in
imprisonment, deprives him of the ability to be free in his person. There is great
value in the freedom to choose what one wears and does not wear on a daily
basis. SOAP's disregard for the implications of this loss of freedom ignores
what is clearly a disability
182. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895 (2010) (conditions of
probation).
183. No. 11 -KH-312, slip op. at *12 (La. Ct. App. 5th July 20, 2011).
184. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:561.2(A) (2009).
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release.' 8 5 Like the predators under SOAP, the offender must
report to his probation officer when told to do so, seek permission
to associate with those who have been convicted of a felony, wear
an electronic monitoring device, and have his probation officer
approve his residence.' 8
When Louisiana Revised Statutes section 15:561 was initially
enacted, the term of supervised release was only five years. In
2009, it was amended to provide for lifetime supervision. 8 7
Prospectively, this change did not create constitutional concerns,
but the legislature provided the increased period of supervision
was to apply retroactively.'8 8 The legislature, clearly realizing the
implications of retroactively increasing the period of supervision,
declared the amendment to be "curative and remedial."' 89 The
court disagreed, and found that because the underlying conditions
of release were punitive, increasing the term from five years to life
increased the crime's punishment.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on Doe's
comparison of registration and probation:
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court found that the appellate
court's holding that the Alaskan registration system was
parallel to supervised release had merit. However, the
Court rejected that holding, reasoning that unlike probation
and supervised release, which 'entail a series of mandatory
conditions ... ,' the Alaska statute provides that offenders
'are free to move where they wish and to live and work as
other citizens, with no supervision.'"91
The court found that "[u]nlike the Alaskan registration statute
which allowes offenders to live, move, and work as they wish, with
no supervision, the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 15:561.5 gives the supervised release officer the authority
to make decisions for the offender."' 92 This, in the court's opinion
made the scheme punitive, and its retroactive application to be
unconstitutional. 193
185. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:561.5 (2009).
186. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:561.5 (2009).
187. Trosclair, No. 11-KH-312, slip op. at *2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *7.
191. Id. at *5.
192. Id. at *6.
193. Id. at *9.
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c. SOAP Promotes Retribution, a Traditional Aim of
Punishment
In Hendricks, the Court found the fact that a criminal conviction
was not a prerequisite to commitment under the Kansas SVPA to be
indicative of the state's non-retributive intent. 194 Under the Kansas
SVPA, although a person suspected of having a "mental
abnormality" was likely to have been convicted of one or more sex
crimes, the crime itself was used only as evidence of the offender's
mental condition and to predict future dangerousness. 195 In contrast,
under SOAP, a criminal conviction is "both a sufficient and a
necessary condition."1 96 A criminal conviction is the exclusive
means by which an assessment is triggered under SOAP. 197 SOAP's
applicability to all imprisoned sex offenders suggests a retributive
attempt by the State to penalize a broad class of individuals defined
solely by the class of crimes for which they have been convicted. 198
d. SOAP Does not Have a Rational Connection to a Non-
Punitive Purpose 199
Public safety is the express concern of the Legislature under
SOAP.200 The legitimacy of this purpose, however, is only half of
the equation under the "connection" factor. The penalizing
mechanism (i.e., probation) must, in its operation, be rationally
194. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997).
195. Id.
196. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 112 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding
this characteristic to be illustrative of the legislature's punitive intent).
197. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.2 (2009) (a person charged with an
offense but not convicted cannot be subject to assessment because he has not
been convicted of a "sex offense as defined in La R.S. 15:541").
198. See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)
(inquiring "whether [the mechanism's] operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"). SOAP does not promote
deterrence. The risk presented by the sexual predator is a product of his "mental
abnormality." The abnormality impacts his volitional capacity, preventing him
from exercising adequate control over his behavior. For this reason, the mere
threat of being placed on probation is not likely to impact his decision-making
process or to deter any further offenses. This reasoning was employed in
Hendricks, where the Court stated that "[t]hose persons committed under the Act
are, by definition, suffering from a 'mental abnormality' or a 'personality
disorder' that prevents them from exercising adequate control over their
behavior. Such persons are therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of
confinement." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362-63.
199. See also discussion supra Part II.D (discussing the rationality of SOAP
from a public policy standpoint).
200. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560 (2009).
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connected to its purpose.201 In Smith v. Doe, for instance, the Alaska
registration statute promoted public safety by enabling citizens to
more readily identify sex offenders. 202 Alaska's requirement that
offenders register and notify the community of their crimes was
rationally connected to this purpose.2 03 Likewise, in Hendricks, the
purpose of the SVPA was public safety, and because sexual
predators are unable to control their dangerousness, confinement
was an appropriate and rational measure to achieve public safety.204
A comparison of the analyses in Smith v. Doe and Hendricks
suggests that the Supreme Court measures rationality by the nature
of the restriction in relation to the overarching purpose of the law.
For instance, the outcome of Smith v. Doe would likely have been
different if instead of requiring sex offenders to register, the state
had required them to pay a large fine. Although the fine would be
less burdensome, the imposition of the fine would be irrational in
relation to the purpose of public safety. Additionally, in Hendricks,
a rational connection may have been lacking if, instead of
commitment, the state sought to place Hendricks in jail for an
additional three months. Aside from being de facto punishment,
the state's placing of Hendricks in jail would merely postpone his
inevitable release and would not constitute a rational response to
his mental abnormality.
SOAP's placing of sexual predators on probation is not rational
in relation to the purpose of public safety. The sexual predator
suffers from a volitional impairment that makes him "a menace to
the health and safety of others."205 Although supervision may deter
the standard sex offender, the sexual predator lacks the ability to
weigh logical considerations. Monitoring and probation
requirements will do nothing to restore his volitional capacity. 206
Additionally, SOAP's complete lack of a treatment component
is irrational. Unlike in Hendricks, where at the time there was
serious doubt as to the availability of treatment, SOAP
acknowledges the benefits of treatment by allowing the predator to
201. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102-03 (2003) (finding that the Alaska
Act "ha[d] a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of 'public safety, which is advanced
by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their communit[y]').
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997).
205. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009).
206. This is not to say that the probation and monitoring requirements are
utterly useless. They are simply an irrational method of proactively combating
the risks posed by the sexual predator because he lacks control over his future
behavior, whether or not he is being monitored.
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appeal his status only if he "is currently receiving treatment."207
Nowhere, however, does the statute provide for treatment; instead,
SOAP requires only that the offender "[s]ubmit to available
medical, psychiatric, or mental health examination and treatment ...
when deemed appropriate and ordered to do so by the probation
and parole officer." 208 Louisiana imposes this same generic
requirement on all prisoners who are released from prison on
parole.2 09 Because treatment is required only if it is available and if
the probation officer deems it appropriate, it is clear that SOAP
does not contemplate a form of treatment that is tailored to the
predator's unique disposition. Clearly, all sexual predators should
be receiving treatment and participating in a well-defined treatment
program, re rdless of whether the probation officer deems it
appropriate. Overall, the lack of treatment demonstrates that
SOAP is nothing more than a punitive method of further
sanctioning high-risk sex offenders.211 Therefore, SOAP's
retroactive application to Louisiana sex offenders is a violation of
the ex post facto prohibition.
V. REFORMING LOUISIANA'S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAW TO PROTECT
THE PUBLIC AND CONFORM TO CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
SOAP fails to protect the public because it punishes sexual
predators instead of confining and treating them. SOAP is an
unconstitutional ex post facto law for essentially the same reason.
The Louisiana Legislature can cure both defects by creating a
legitimate regulatory scheme whereby sexual predators are
identified by qualified personnel and treated for their mental
conditions. To achieve this goal the state must: (1) create a
competent mental health panel; (2) assess predators before they are
sentenced and provide them treatment while in prison; and (3) create
an effective treatment program that restricts the predator, but is
geared towards rehabilitation and eventual reintegration into society.
207. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.5 (2009).
208. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3 (2009).
209. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4.2.
210. For a discussion on effective (and ineffective) methods of treatment for
sex offenders and sexual predators, see Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in
the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L.
505 (1998).
211. This was the position taken by the dissent in Hendricks, where Justice
Breyer stated that "when a State decides offenders can be treated and confines
an offender to provide that treatment, but then refuses to provide it, the refusal to
treat while a person is fully incapacitated begins to look punitive." Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 390 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. Reforming the Panel
The first step in creating a non-punitive, practical scheme to
assess potential sexual predators is the creation of a competent
mental health panel. Because the difference between the sex
offender and the sexual predator is the presence of a mental
abnormality, each member of the panel should have credentials in
the field of mental health. For example, the State of Texas uses a
two-step method whereby a multi-disciplinary panel makes an
initial assessment of the offender.2 12 This initial assessment,
however, does not identify an abnormality, but rather predicts only
whether the offender is likely to commit offenses in the future. 213 if
the panel makes this prediction, only then will the offender be
assessed for a "behavioral abnormality." 2 14 The Department of
Mental Health or the Department of Criminal Justice then makes
the ultimate conclusion as to whether the offender has a
"behavioral abnormality" by utilizing a clinical assessment:
To aid in the assessment, the department required to make
the assessment shall use an expert to examine the person.
That department may contract for the expert services
required by this subsection. The expert shall make a clinical
assessment based on testing for psychopathy, a clinical
interview, and other appropriate assessments and
techniques to aid the department in its assessment. 2 15
Under the current procedures in Louisiana, a method such as
Texas's may be difficult because the SOAP panel is assessing
hundreds of offenders.2 16 Dr. Tucker stated that due to the high
volume of assessments the panel assesses the average offender in as
little as 20 minutes.217 According to Dr. Tucker, these current
procedures are insufficient and do not enable the panel to identify a
"mental abnormality." 218 Instead of attempting to assess hundreds of
offenders, the panel should filter the offenders it assesses based on
risk. A useful strategy may be to limit assessment to the following
categories of offenders: offenders who have been convicted of an
aggravated offense; offenders who have previously been charged
212. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.022 (2009).
213. Id.
214. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.023 (2009).
215. Id.
216. According to Dr. Tucker, the panel has assessed approximately 1,200
offenders. Transcript of Hearing at 12, Louisiana v. Golston, No. 01-98-0002
(La. Jud. Dist. Ct. 19th Sept. 28, 2010).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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and convicted of a sex offense; or offenders for whom the Attorney
General petitions the court for assessment. This system would
ensure that the panel always assesses those who have committed the
most heinous sex offenses and those who have committed multiple
sex offenses. Moreover, by allowing the Attorney General to
petition for assessment, the law would permit the State to assess an
offender who does not fall within a defined category, but whom the
State nonetheless believes to be a violent predator.
The Louisiana panel, like the Texas panel, should evaluate
possible predators in a one-on-one, in-depth manner. Of the
hundreds of individuals assessed by Dr. Tucker, only two have
actually appeared before the panel. 19 Identification of a "mental
abnormality" should require more than a statistical assessment of
risk. After all, a "mental abnormality" is a "congenital or acquired
condition of a person."220 Currently, the panel looks only at prior
crimes and any records provided to them by the Department of
Corrections.221 An effort on the part of the panel to look at the
individual, apart from and in conjunction with the crimes he has
committed, would create a more accurate and meaningful
determination. 222
B. Early Identification and Post-Prison Assessment
There is no reason the assessment should take place only six
months before the offender is released from prison. The panel
should assess the offender at the beginning of his sentence, which
would enable him to participate in treatment while incarcerated.223
Although the State need not exempt the offender from punishment,
treating the offender while in prison is a practical measure.
219. Id.
220. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1 (2009).
221. Id.
222. One method that has been shown to be accurate is clinical evaluation,
used in conjunction with statistical risk assessment. This method utilizes an
individual clinical evaluation, but removes bias by also utilizing statistical risk
prediction. See Winick, supra note 210, at 560.
223. The dissent in Hendricks was critical of the Kansas SVPA's failure to
provide offenders with treatment during incarceration, saying that
it is particularly difficult to see why legislators who specifically wrote
into the statute a finding that "prognosis for rehabilitating . . . in a
prison setting is poor" would leave an offender in that setting for
months or years before beginning treatment. This is to say, the timing
provisions of the statute confirm the Kansas Supreme Court's view that
treatment was not a particularly important legislative objective.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 386 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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If the offender receives treatment while in prison, the panel
should conduct a second assessment prior to his release. A
determination of the success of the treatment should be left to the
professionals on the panel. Of course, even if treatment is
successful and the offender is released without being deemed a
predator, the State will still require him to register and notify the
* * , *224
community pursuant to Louisiana's registration laws. This
ensures that there will be a buffer between the community and any
risk the offender may still pose.
C. Rehabilitation
The legislature's creation of an individualized assessment that is
focused on mental health will make SOAP's procedures more
characteristic of a civil regulatory scheme. Regardless of the
procedures, however, the State must impose restrictions that are
specifically and rationally tailored to the sexual predator's
underlying condition. This is not to say that sexual predators should
be subject to fewer restrictions than SOAP currently provides. On
the contrary, depending on the severity of their conditions, certain
predators may need to be civilly committed. What is critical is that
the level of monitoring and confinement be unique to the predator
and that it be carried out with the hope of rehabilitation. Under the
guidance of expert opinions, courts should determine the appropriate
level of restriction on an individual basis.
All sexual predators are not equally dangerous.225 Courts
should implement predators' restrictions on an individual basis
using the "least restrictive alternative.",22 6 Many states use risk
assessment strategies, in which offenders are evaluated and their
224. SOAP only assesses those who are "sex offenders"-as the term is
defined by Louisiana's Registration Statute. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542
(2009). Thus, every person who appears before the panel has committed a crime
for which he will have to register as a sex offender. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:560.1 (2009).
225. For an excellent discussion of risk assessment and the practice of
differentiating between different types of sexual predators, see Eric S. Janus &
Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use ofActuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders:
Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443 (2003).
226. See generally John Q. La Fond, Outpatient Commitment's Next
Frontier: Sexual Predators, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 159 (2003). The term
"least restrictive alternative" refers to the practice of placing a predator in the
environment with the least restriction. This environment, however, still allows
the state to have sufficient control over the predator, in order to keep the public
safe. For some, the least restrictive environment may be civil commitment.
These offenders are not safe if they are given any degree of freedom. Id.
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treatment is managed based on their risk.227 For example, the panel
may assess a particular offender and find him to be a sexual
predator. However, relative to other predators, his mental condition
and future risk may be less severe. Leroy Hendricks, for example,
was determined to be especially dangerous, largely based on his
own admissions, but also because he lacked the ability to
understand the significance of his crimes. 22 8 At least initially, an
individual such as Hendricks may belong in an institution where he
can receive treatment and be completely confined.
Other predators, although dangerous, may fare better in an
outpatient setting. Currently, Texas has a program the state refers
to as "outpatient civil commitment." 229 Under this program, a
panel assesses the predators to determine their status, but instead of
institutionalizing them the state requires that they participate in
intensive outpatient treatment.2 30 As a practical matter, the
restrictions imposed on predators in the Texas program are likely
greater than those that SOAP imposes. The restrictions under the
Texas program, however, constitute an integral part of its treatment
component, rather than a mere means of punishing predators.231
Allowing lower-risk predators to participate in outpatient
treatment would produce several benefits. First, it would still allow
the State to closely monitor sexual predators. The intense treatment
focus, however, would likely cause a court to view the restrictions232
as non-punitive.22 Second, compared to a pure civil commitment
227. See John Q. La Fond & Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Reentry Courts:
A Proposal for Managing the Risk of Returning Sex Offenders to the
Community, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 1173, 1185 (2004) ("Risk management is a
strategy that is now being used more frequently to prevent sex offenders from
committing more sex crimes. It is much more effective than simply using a
prediction strategy. Risk-management requires an initial risk assessment for
each sex offender, employing state-of-the-art actuarial instruments and other
techniques, when an offender is first sentenced. His release into the community
would subsequently be managed using this strategy. Government authorities
then increase or decrease control over the offender in the institution and in the
community in light of ongoing assessments of risk.").
228. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
229. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.001-150 (2009).
230. Id.
231. For instance, the Texas predator is not allowed to initially live without
supervision, but must stay in a residential facility. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
841.082 (2009). The predator must also submit to electronic monitoring. Id
232. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). In Allen, the Court found the
provision of treatment to be indicative of a non-punitive intent, saying:
We are unpersuaded by petitioner's efforts to challenge this conclusion.
Under the Act, the State has a statutory obligation to provide care and
treatment for persons adjudged sexually dangerous designed to effect
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scheme, outpatient commitment would cost significantly less.233
Granted, it would cost more than the current probation under
SOAP, but the benefits would far outweigh the costs. In addition to
being constitutional, outpatient commitment would allow the State
to both monitor and treat the sexual predator.234 Moreover, the
State would still have the option to criminally punish those who
violate the restrictions of the outpatient program. Third, the
offender would be allowed to partially re-integrate into society,
which would allow his treatment to address real-world problems
and prepare him to deal with his condition in a realistic setting.235
Ideally, as the offender progressed, the restrictions the State
placed upon him would decrease. This does not mean, however,
that the State would lose control over the offender. The State
would still require that the sexual predator comply with its
registration and notification laws. Although the predator may never
break free from the stigma of being a sex offender, he may still one
day become a productive member of society.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sex offenses are heinous crimes, and those who commit them
deserve punishment. The State of Louisiana may prospectively
impose longer prison sentences for all sex offenses if it wishes to
recovery, in a facility set aside to provide psychiatric care. And if the
patient is found to be no longer dangerous, the court shall order that he
be discharged. While the committed person has the burden of showing
that he is no longer dangerous, he may apply for release at any time. In
short, the State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for
the treatment of those it commits, and established a system under which
committed persons may be released after the briefest time in
confinement.
Id. at 369-370 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233. The annual cost per person would likely be between $20,000 and
$30,000. See Millhollon, supra note 128 (discussing Representative Mill's
decision to abandon an outpatient treatment program after finding out that
Texas's program may cost up to $30,000 a year per offender).
234. That is, a system of monitoring could take place within the program.
Perhaps the Department of Probation and Parole could assist the treatment
program with enforcement. But, unlike under the current provisions, the role of the
probation officer would be ancillary to the primary objective of treatment and
reintegration. See also La Fond & Winick, supra note 232, at 1190-95 (suggesting
a "Community Containment Approach" that utilizes a multi-disciplinary treatment
team and requires the predator to submit to polygraph testing).
235. Id. at 1187-1200.
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do so. 236 It cannot, however, impose additional, retroactive
punishment upon convicted sex offenders simply because a three-
person panel thinks they will strike again. Sex offender laws have
already blurred the line that separates criminal punishment from
other legitimate regulatory measures. SOAP clearly crosses
whatever line still exists. The State cannot transform probation into
a non-punitive restriction simply because it is designed to protect
the community. If the State were permitted to do so, all criminals
could be perpetually sanctioned in the name of public safety.
Certain rare and violent predators, however, need to be separated
from society and receive extensive treatment. These "sexually
violent predators" are not standard recidivists, but are rather the
deeply disturbed members of society who cannot control their
sexual deviance.
SOAP's assessment procedures fail to appreciate the sexual
predator's unique mindset. They attempt to sift through the entire
population of sex offenders and arbitrarily mark those whom the
panel suspects are most likely to reoffend. Given SOAP's current
assessment rate, thousands of offenders will be placed on SOAP
probation in the coming years. Among these offenders, a small
number will actually be "sexually violent predators." Louisiana
must take steps to accurately identify and separate this small
segment of the sex offender population. When identified, these
individuals should be confined, monitored, and treated within a
framework that is conducive to eventual rehabilitation. If
Louisiana fails to do these things, it is waiting for the sexual
predator to strike again.
Brock Skelley*
236. These sentences would operate prospectively, and therefore the ex post
facto prohibition would not be implicated. In other words, an increase in sentences
for all future sex offenders would mean that the law would not be retroactive.
* J.D./D.C.L., 2012, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
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